

Examining Political Group Membership on LiveJournal

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The combination of expanding opportunities for political expression and information consumption, the increased response to and active use of the Internet by the government, and the growing number of Internet users all shape the prospects and potential of Internet use in the Russian Federation. Regardless of a limited audience and group of information providers, the Internet is growing as an influential source of political information and a mechanism for political action and organization. The value of the Internet as a political tool in the Russian Federation rests in its potential to increase the visibility of oppositional politicians, provide access to censored information, and allow for independent organization of political action by Russian citizens. Additionally, the use of the Internet by much of the younger generation suggests that as they age and gain power within the political structure, the current influence of ideas expressed on the Internet and the future possibilities of the Internet for political use will rise within the larger political structure of the Russian Federation.

This project initially began as an attempt to describe the way Russian bloggers were using the Internet for political purposes, what topics they were most concerned about, and the amount of genuine influence they possessed with Russian society. After months of combing through blogs little progress was made. The project was restructured cross referencing blogging “groups.” As groups on LiveJournal can be joined or watched by members, they provided me with group profiles that enabled me to see what groups were the most popular, the range of the political ideas being represented, and crossover between groups. Statistics on how many members are watching and belong to a group are available on the group profile, making it useful for comparison and research, as well as information posted in member profiles regarding political affiliation or the purpose of their activity.

It was my belief that despite the relatively low level of political interest on LiveJournal (and more broadly on the Web) that the Internet serves as an extremely important tool for political organization as an independent source of information.

The variance in groups and cross over in competing political interests is a testimony to this. Additionally, I believe that the groups represented online will tend to be more radical and varied in opinion than the political attitudes held by the general population.


Internet Demographics: Who is Online?

Despite the increasing popularity of the Internet in the Russian Federation, use is still in large part limited by issues of accessibility. The rise in Internet users suggests increasing accessibility to the Internet and increased Internet content, as well as a diversification of possible uses; however, a number of factors continue to hamper Internet accessibility in the Russian Federation. Although the cost of Internet access has decreased, with fees now being affordable on smaller salaries, concerns over the cost of access remain. Low numbers of personal or home-based connections are exacerbated by limited Internet access in certain educational institutions. While educational institutions serve as access point for many Russians, a majority were still not connected to the Internet as of 2006. Federal programs have been developed to address this issue, with a goal of connecting 52,940 schools to the Internet by the end of 2007 (ITAR-TASS Daily 2006). Use of and access to the Internet also appears to be limited by the remoteness of regions, gender, and age.

An understanding of the demographics of the Internet is vital in determining the potential and current relevance of the Internet in the Russian Federation. Generally speaking, the average Internet user¹ in the Russian Federation at the time of the data collection in 2007 was quite young, well educated, and urban (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). The age of Internet users is particularly important because it opens up the possibility for an increase in the importance of the Internet in the political arena as the users mature and gain influence within the political sphere. The average Internet user shares many demographic characteristics with those expected to become political elite, thus the current Internet users have a high likelihood of having significant influence on the Russian political system in the future.

At the time of the analysis the number of Internet users was steadily and significantly increasing in the Russian Federation. The frequency of use, however, is generally much higher when one considers the amount of Russian Internet users who have been online within the last 24 hours was higher than the amount of users who reported Internet use in the previous six months in 2002 (Public Opinion Foundation 2007).

Figure 1. Frequency of Internet use among residents of the Russian Federation



Source: *The Internet in Russia/Russia on the Internet* (Public Opinion Foundation, 2007), <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/projects/ocherk/eint0701>

¹ For survey purposes, I defined an Internet user as anyone who has accessed the World Wide Web or email within the last six months.

Internet use in the Russian Federation seemed to vary significantly by region. The highest concentration of Internet users could be found in the Central Region (excluding Moscow), followed closely behind the Moscow area. The areas had 4.8 and 4.7 million Internet users respectively. However, it is important to note that the Moscow region had a significantly higher percentage of the population categorized as Internet users at 57 percent compared to the central regions at 23 percent. The population density in the Central Region is the highest of the federal districts at 57.1 persons per square kilometre (this figure includes Moscow), however it still lags Moscow considerable, as Moscow's density is 5,797 persons per square kilometre (Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennou Statistiki 2008). The lowest population of Internet users were found in the Far Eastern Region, with only 1.6 million Internet users (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). Of these regions, the Far Eastern Region also has the lowest population density at 1.1 persons per square kilometre (Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennou Statistiki 2008). The lowest concentration of Internet users was in the Volga Basin, where only 20 percent of the population had accessed the Internet in the last six months (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). The Volga Basin has a population density of 29.2 persons per square kilometre (Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennou Statistiki 2008). Concentration of Internet users may have a relationship with population density in more populated regions, but it appears other factors also affect Internet use by region.

There are multiple locations from which Russian citizens can access the Internet, with some being more popular than others, and new locations becoming available as technology, particularly wireless, develops. The home has become the most popular place for Russian citizens to access the Internet with 60 percent of Russian citizens reporting that they access the Internet from their personal residence (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). This can be assessed as a positive indicator of Internet proliferation because it demonstrates that the Internet is available to individuals who do not necessarily have access to state-run institutions or large corporation. Not only is the Internet now widely available in the home, the home has become the mostly widely preferred access point suggesting that the uses of the Internet are going beyond work and research, and showed signs of becoming recreational in 2007 (Public Opinion Foundation 2007).

The workplace was the second most popular Internet access point in the Russian Federation, with 39 percent of the population accessing the Internet at their job. However, workplace Internet access rates have actually slowly declined since their peak in the autumn of 2003 (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). The negative trend in workplace access seems to have both positive and negative implications. This shift suggests a positive change in availability of the Internet at home and use of the Internet for non-work purposes. When examining the political potential of the Internet this can be viewed as a positive trend, suggesting people are finding new uses for the Internet; however, increased Internet access at the workplace would suggest increased use of the Internet for business purposes, which could have positive implications for the Russian economy. Additional Internet access points (in order of popularity) include friends' homes, schools and universities, via mobile phones, and Internet cafes.

The use of the mobile phone for Internet access was a relatively new phenomenon in the Russian Federation at the time of the analysis. Statistics on its popularity as an access have only been recorded since the summer of 2006 by the Public Opinion Foundation; however in

that time span access via mobile phones has already surpassed Internet access in Internet cafés. By spring of 2007, 8 percent of Internet users in the Russian Federation reported accessing the Internet from mobile phones (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). The introduction and popularity of Internet access via mobile suggests that new technology can be quickly introduced and incorporated into usage patterns within the Russian Federation. The changes of availability and popularity of access points within the Federation hold potential for evaluating shifts in other preferences and trends, such as content preferences and potential for new technology.

Within the Russian Federation a gender imbalance existed amongst Internet users, with males being more likely to access the Internet. On a national level 30 percent of males and 21 percent females were Internet users in 2007. This gap was also replicated in the regions; and there was significant regional variation in the size of the gender gap. The Central Region had the largest gender imbalance with only 17 percent of females and 29 percent of males identified as Internet users. The gender gap was significantly smaller in the Siberian region with 20 percent of females and 22 percent of males using the Internet. It is important to note that a gender imbalance existed within the general population of the Russian Federation, skewed positively towards women. The implication of this imbalance is that despite lower rates of Internet use the actual population of Internet users was not as imbalanced, with 45 percent of the population of Internet users being female and 55 percent male (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). There is also evidence that suggest that this gender gap did not exist, or in some cases, was even reversed within more specific Internet demographics, such as blog owners and writers (as will be discussed later). There does not seem to be any conclusive explanation for the gender gap in Internet use, however, though financial constraints, availability of access, time constraints, and interest in content are all possible influencing factors.

Significant demographic variations also existed when Internet users are categorized by age, with younger people being much more likely to use the Internet. In the spring of 2007, 18 to 24 year olds were the most likely to use the Internet with 54 percent of Russian citizens within that age range reporting Internet use in the last six months. This age demographic makes up for 36 percent of the total population of Internet users in the Russian Federation. Russians aged 25-34 years were the second largest group of Internet users, accounting for 29 percent of the total population of Internet users (Public Opinion Foundation 2007). Combined these two age demographics also have historically significance, 65 percent of the Internet users in the Russian Federation were 18 years old or younger when the Soviet Union ended. The lowest population of Internet users is people over 55, who accounted for only 3 percent of Internet users within the Russian Federation (Public Opinion Foundation 2007).

Blog demographics differed from the general patterns of Internet use (often to an extreme degree), particularly in terms of gender and age. Unlike the general pool of Internet users in the Russian Federation, 60 percent of blog owners were female. Blog owners were also younger than general Internet users, with the average age being 21 years. Most blog owners (80%) lived in either St. Petersburg or Moscow. The blog owners were most likely to host their blogs on LiveJournal.com (44.8%), Diary.ru (13.2%), and Blogs.mail.ru (7.3%). Blogs were quickly growing in popularity with over 1,150,000 registered to Russian citizens in 2006 and over 100 new blogs being created every hour (Yandex 2006). The skewed demo-

graphics of blog owners in the Russian Federation increase the power and presence of young, urban Russians on the Internet.

Blogging and Internet user demographics have changed in Russia since 2007 when the group membership was investigated. The number of blogs overall has increased, but consistent activity on blogs is decreasing. LiveJournal no longer hosts the most Russian blogs, but it remains the most visited blog site. LiveInternet.Ru now hosts the largest number of blogs, but the blogs are largely inactive (96 percent have not been updated within the previous three months). The average blogger continues to resemble their 2006 counterpart in age and sex (Yandex 2009). The increase of Internet users has slowed somewhat since 2006, although a 9 percent increase was reported between autumn 2008 and spring 2009 (Public Opinion Foundation, March 2009). Previously established Internet users are increasing activity (Public Opinion Foundation, Summer 2009). An inverse relationship continues between age and Internet use, with 67 percent of 18-24 year olds and 6 percent of Russians 55 years and older reporting Internet use (Public Opinion Foundation, March 2009, 2).

The Political Use of the Internet in the Russian Federation

The political uses of the Internet by both citizens and the government in the Russian Federation are expanding and becoming more widespread. The number of individual citizens seeking to provide and obtain information on the Internet is also increasing. While the effect of this trend is difficult to measure, close examination of particular cases highlight the importance of the Internet in Russian politics. One example of the effect of independent information sources is the case of the blogosphere offering opportunities to improve and expand political discourse while raising the importance of and empowering average citizens within the political sphere. Within the blogosphere, blog sites serve a multitude of functions aside from blog hosting. Members are able to create profiles and communicate with other members; they are also able to join and watch groups.

There are several possible ways to evaluate the Russian political blogosphere. For the purpose of this paper, a method involving evaluation of membership in blog groups within Russian LiveJournal Blogs was developed. LiveJournal blogs were chosen because LiveJournal is the most popular blog host in the Russian Federation (Yandex 2006), so it provided the largest potential sample for political blogs. Lists of individuals “watching” general, non-partisan political focus were compared with lists of individuals from oppositional and pro-institutional groups that focused on political issues relatively unique to the Russian Federation. For ease of explanation, the general nonpartisan groups will be referred to as Group A and the groups centred on specific political issues, both oppositional and pro-institutional (pro-Putin, pro-Kremlin, etc.) will be referred to as Group B. The comparison was run on 22 November 2007. Group A consisted of two large groups, one with 3,493 members, and the other with 694 members. Both groups were general groups including articles on a variety of Russian political articles. Group B consisted of twelve groups. The groups in Group B varied in function and emphasis, some focused on people such as Prime Minister and former President Vladimir Putin or the jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, political parties, a political goal, or event. Detailed descriptions of these groups are available in the

appendix. When membership lists of groups A and B were cross compared, the results were unexpected and informative. Full results and brief group descriptions are listed in the appendix.

Comparing group membership in political blog groups on LiveJournal.ru revealed higher than expected levels of oppositional groups and activity of some members in seemingly contradictory groups, suggesting that some bloggers may be interested in different political perspectives and using the blogosphere as a space for political inquiry. The most logical reason for viewing blogs with varied political stances is to obtain a variety of facts and opinions on particular issues for personal or organizational purposes. While it is possible that Internet users could be independently monitoring blogs with varying view points, it seems more likely that members of organizations are monitoring groups for organizational purposes. This purpose especially seems more likely when viewpoints are completely contradictory, as is the case with members of the “Anti-Orange” group,² dedicated to institutional support and stifling an attempt at a colour revolution; this shares members with the group “Stop Putin Ru,” a group of bloggers who disagree with the policies of Vladimir Putin and his administration and campaign against them. Table 1 illustrates examples of bloggers in contradictory groups. Totals of bloggers watching each group are listed below the group name. Oppositional groups are listed in the first column, while pro-institutional groups are listed in the top row.

Table 1. Bloggers Watching Contradictory Political Groups

	Kremlin Org	Anti Orange	Nashi Storonnik	Nashi Center
RU NGO	2	0	1	2
Open Russia	9	1	4	5
Stop Putin	15	4	8	6
Youth Yabloko	1	0	0	0

Source: The author.

The sample of blogs used is extremely small and includes only 0.33 percent of the Russian blogging population; however, it should be noted that these are the largest general interest political blog rings on the largest blog host in the Russian Federation. This low level of political blogging registered in political blog groups suggests that most bloggers are not generally blogging about politics, and, if they are, they are not concerned with communicating with others on political issues.

Despite low levels of proliferation of political blogs it is important to note the relatively high percentage of oppositional blogs and political bloggers watching oppositional blogs on LiveJournal.ru. For example, when comparing Internet users watching the general political interest blog group RU Politics with polarized political groups of similar size, 1.9 percent are also watching Nashi Storonnik and 1.6 percent are watching Stop Putin. Other political groups that focus on methods of political participation or specific topics instead of a political figure or group, but are still seemingly oppositional are very popular. One such group is RU Protest, which gives information about various protests and theories of protesting, and it is popular amongst politically oriented bloggers. The fact that in many cases interest in opposi-

² Relevant URLs for these groups can be located in the Appendix.

tional blogs is almost as strong in interest in pro-institutional blogs suggests that LiveJournal.ru is providing an effective forum for expressing political dissatisfaction and obtaining independent political information.

Putting the Picture Together: Does the Internet Matter in the Russian Political Sphere?

The ongoing policy response by the Russian government may be the most telling indicator of the political importance of the Internet. The Internet has been a subject of state policy since 1991, however the types of policies and level of interest has changed drastically since the beginning of the Putin administration in 2000. Initial Internet policies, including attempts at censorship were highly ineffective, as these policies had been adapted from more antiquated forms of technology. These policy attempts were followed by much more direct forms of censorship. The most debated include the System for Operational-Investigative Activities (SORM) and SORM-2. SORM required Internet services providers to allow the FSB unrestricted access to all email and Internet activity without a warrant. SORM-2 required all Internet service providers to route services through the FSB at the cost of the providers for ease of intelligence gathering. SORM-2 was challenged in court and it was determined that the FSB must provide a warrant before obtaining information on Internet users (Alexander 2004).

Despite censorship, the Russian government has also taken measures to promote increased Internet use. In 2001, the E-Russia Plan was designed to increase Internet access, stimulate the economy, and raise the technical standards of Russian web sites to become economically competitive on an international level. To accomplish these goals the Russian Federal Government budgeted 2.6 billion dollars for the E-Russia Plan. The funding however was drastically cut back shortly after it was approved. The current success of the plan is difficult to determine (Alexander 2004).

Developments suggest that the Russia government may be taking a new approach to Internet policy by having political insiders purchase the problematic web sites or hosts, taking control through economic means. Such is the case with LiveJournal.com, which was purchased by Moscow-based Internet company SUP on 2 December 2007. SUP is financially backed by Kremlin insider Aleksandr Mamut. The sale has the Russian blogging community extremely concerned. SUP has purchased the rights to the entire LiveJournal site and servers, which give SUP control of all LiveJournal blogs internationally. Spokesmen for SUP and LiveJournal have attempted to quash fears and attempted to discredit those expressing concerns (McDougall 2007). Past Internet policy such as SORM and SORM-2 coupled with strict media control and harsh punishment of political dissidents all point towards a future with continuing restriction on freedom of speech in the Russian Federation. Given the current political climate oppositional bloggers' concerns seem justified. The purchase of LiveJournal by a political insider suggests that the importance and potential for political opposition on the Internet was recognized by the Putin administration.

Three major characteristics of blogging activity were demonstrated on LiveJournal. The first characteristic in particular may have influenced the Putin Administration's views on LiveJournal. The views of LiveJournal groups tended to be more oppositional or polar than attitudes found in the general population. Expectedly, political groups also represented a very low percentage of total blogging groups on LiveJournal. Unexpectedly, many members were watching groups with conflicting interests. This suggests that users are either attempting to

gain competing perspectives from independent sources, or members of groups are monitoring groups with competing viewpoints out of interest or a desire to engage competing blogs.

The results validate certain theories that the Internet can spur of increased activism. It does so by providing tools for activists to organize. The blog groups also link individuals in online communities, forming citizens' networks (Deibert 2000). Specifically, the wide range of political groups supports the viewpoint that the relative freedom of expression and popularity of independent information sources make the Internet an extremely important political tool, particularly for oppositional politicians and activists (Semetko and Krasnoboka 2003). What the results do not verify are ideas that the Internet is used only passively as a political information source in Russia (Ovchinnikov 2003), as independent sources of information are provided via popular political blogs. In fact, the prevalence of political apathy observed in the general population of the Russian Federation (Ovchinnikov 2003) also seems evident on LiveJournal. Because many blog groups attempt to politically organize people outside of cyberspace it seems that the Internet is not developing in a way where most interaction will occur strictly in cyberspace as Smith and Kelemen (2001) have suggested.

The popularity of LiveJournal as a platform for radical political views reaffirms its importance as organizational tool, particularly for groups that are restricted in other forms of political participation (i.e., general elections and protests). Several explanations exist as to why LiveJournal is an attractive platform for more "radical" political groups. The first is anonymity. Blogging communities such as LiveJournal provide the opportunity for a more anonymous space, offering users the opportunity for political involvement or information gathering with less fear of repercussions. Secondly, LiveJournal does not restrict the amount of groups a user can start or monitor, so groups with targeted political interests are able to higher numbers of group pages. It also does not restrict the scope or topic of a page, unlike other mediums. The flexibility of LiveJournal may be an attraction to radical groups. Finally, LiveJournal may also be serving as a virtual testing ground for some political ideas. It provides an opportunity for users to post radical political opinions and gauge feedback of them without face to face confrontation.

Various political implications and social implications stem from the prevalence of radical groups on LiveJournal. If the existence and multitude of radical groups provide further support for claims of institutional learning in Russia, it could also offer promise of democratic growth. If institutional learning is taking place, given the right political climate political behaviour may become more democratic (Mishler and Rose 2007). Another implication is a possible affirmation that people feel politically "safer" in cyberspace. This can be viewed both positively and negatively. The protection of dissident opinions can be viewed positively, but the separation of dissident opinions from more mainstream outlets of political expression may be negative. It may cause political isolation and social isolation previously discussed.

My observations indicate that the Internet is politically influential within the Russian Federation and is gaining popularity as a tool for opposition, acquiring independent information, and organizing political opposition. The increasing government response to Internet use, particularly in the political arena reveals an understanding of the importance of the Internet as a political tool in the Russian Federation. The purchase of LiveJournal, the most popular blogging site in the Russian Federation by a company closely tied to the Kremlin, suggests to some that political expression on the Internet is in danger (McDougall 2007). The Internet is

the main source of independent information in a state with government controlled media, and this closing of the information space will hurt oppositional political forces within the Russian Federation. Currently, Russians are able to express political views, share information, and organize for politically causes effectively on the Internet, but increased governmental control and surveillance may result in closing this outlet, shutting down political opposition even further. Furthermore, the Internet and more specifically the blog community is essentially controlled by the younger generation. The effects of increased Internet control will be felt the most by this generation. These controls have the potential not only to cut off an outlet of expression for the younger generations, but also create further distrust between Russian citizens and the Russian government.

Appendix

Blog Groups:

- Ru_politics [http://community.livejournal.com/ru_politics/profile]: General interest group on politics in the Russian Federation; watched by 3,493 bloggers
- Politics_ru [http://community.livejournal.com/politics_ru/profile]: General interest group on politics in the Russian Federation, watched by 694 bloggers
- Kreml_org (Kremlin Organization) [http://community.livejournal.com/kreml_org/profile]: Pro-institutional political blog with a focus on the President; watched by 440 bloggers
- Ru_Protest [http://community.livejournal.com/ru_protest/profile]: Group enables the promotion of events, sharing of protest pictures and video, and the exchange of “protest theory; watched by 294 bloggers.
- Nashi_Centr (“Ours Center”) [http://community.livejournal.com/nashi_centra] Dedicated to the pro-Putin youth group Nashi (“Ours”); watched 273 bloggers. (Note: This group has been deleted.)
- Preemnik (“Successor,” as in the presidential successor): [http://community.livejournal.com/preemnik_ru/profile] Discussion on possible successors to Putin in 2008 and the quality of the election; watched by 255 bloggers.
- Nashi_Storonnik (“Ours Supporter”) [http://community.livejournal.com/nashi_storonnik/profile]: Dedicated to the pro-Putin youth group Nashi (“Ours”); watched by 174 bloggers
- Anti_orange [http://community.livejournal.com/anti_orange/profile]: Dedicated to preventing a color revolution in the Russian Federation; watched by 79 bloggers
- Stop Putin Ru [http://community.livejournal.com/stop_putin_ru/profile]: An anti-Putin group watched by 157 bloggers
- Molpolitica (“Youth Politics”) [<http://community.livejournal.com/molpolitica/profile>]: Discusses Russian government policy directed at youth; watched by 65 members.
- Open_Russia [http://community.livejournal.com/open_russia/profile]: Advocates the growth of civil society in the Russian Federation and is associated with Yabloko and Mikhail Khodorkovsky; watched by 55 bloggers

- Youth Yabloko (“Youth Apple”) [<http://community.livejournal.com/youthyabloko/profile>]: Oppositional youth group affiliated with the political party Yabloko; watched by 45 bloggers
- Ru_NGO [http://community.livejournal.com/ru_ngo/profile]: A group advocating NGO involvement in Russian civil society; watched by 22 bloggers

Results for ru_politics (3,493 members):

369 of the members in ru_politics are also members of politics_ru
 262 of the members in ru_politics are also members of kreml_org
 45 of the members in ru_politics are also members of antiorange
 66 of the members in ru_politics are also members of nashi_storonnik
 104 of the members in ru_politics are also members of nashi_center
 3 of the members in ru_politics are also members of ru_ngo
 126 of the members in ru_politics are also members of ruprotest
 18 of the members in ru_politics are also members of open_russia
 55 of the members in ru_politics are also members of stop_putinru
 22 of the members in ru_politics are also members of youthyabloko

Results for politics_ru (694 members):

369 of the members in politics_ru are also members of ru_politics
 116 of the members in politics_ru are also members of kreml_org
 23 of the members in politics_ru are also members of antiorange
 37 of the members in politics_ru are also members of nashi_storonnik
 38 of the members in politics_ru are also members of nashi_center
 3 of the members in politics_ru are also members of ru_ngo
 58 of the members in politics_ru are also members of ruprotest
 15 of the members in politics_ru are also members of open_russia
 33 of the members in politics_ru are also members of stop_putinru
 1 of the members in politics_ru is also a member of youthyabloko

Results for kreml_org (440 members):

262 of the members in kreml_org are also members of ru_politics
 116 of the members in kreml_org are also members of politics_ru
 22 of the members in kreml_org are also members of antiorange
 33 of the members in kreml_org are also members of nashi_storonnik
 46 of the members in kreml_org are also members of preemnik
 41 of the members in kreml_org are also members of nashi_center
 2 of the members in kreml_org are also members of ru_ngo
 25 of the members in kreml_org are also members of ruprotest
 9 of the members in kreml_org are also members of open_russia
 15 of the members in kreml_org are also members of stop_putinru
 1 of the members in kreml_org is also a member of youthyabloko

Results for ruprotest (294 members):

126 of the members in ruprotest are also members of ru_politics
58 of the members in ruprotest are also members of politics_ru
25 of the members in ruprotest are also members of kreml_org
8 of the members in ruprotest are also members of antiorange
10 of the members in ruprotest are also members of nashi_storonnik
17 of the members in ruprotest are also members of nashi_center
1 of the members in ruprotest is also a member of ru_ngo
7 of the members in ruprotest are also members of open_russia
27 of the members in ruprotest are also members of stop_putinru
2 of the members in ruprotest are also members of youthyabloko

Results for nashi_centra (273 members):

104 of the members in nashi_center are also members of ru_politics
38 of the members in nashi_center are also members of politics_ru
41 of the members in nashi_center are also members of kreml_org
24 of the members in nashi_center are also members of antiorange
87 of the members in nashi_center are also members of nashi_storonnik
2 of the members in nashi_center are also members of ru_ngo
17 of the members in nashi_center are also members of ruprotest
5 of the members in nashi_center are also members of open_russia
6 of the members in nashi_center are also members of stop_putinru
0 of the members in nashi_center are also members of youthyabloko

Results for preemnik (255 members):

120 of the members in preemnik are also members of ru_politics
60 of the members in preemnik are also members of politics_ru
46 of the members in preemnik are also members of kreml_org
31 of the members in preemnik are also members of antiorange
37 of the members in preemnik are also members of nashi_storonnik
33 of the members in preemnik are also members of nashi_center
1 of the members in preemnik is also a member of ru_ngo
24 of the members in preemnik are also members of ruprotest
11 of the members in preemnik are also members of open_russia
16 of the members in preemnik are also members of stop_putinru
2 of the members in preemnik are also members of youthyabloko

Results for nashi_storonnik (174 members):

66 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of ru_politics
37 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of politics_ru
33 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of kreml_org
25 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of antiorange
9 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of molpolitica
87 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of nashi_center
1 of the members in nashi_storonnik is also a member of ru_ngo
10 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of ruprotest

4 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of open_russia
8 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of stop_putinru
0 of the members in nashi_storonnik are also members of youthyabloko

Results for anti_orange (79 members):

45 of the members in antiorange are also members of ru_politics
23 of the members in antiorange are also members of politics_ru
22 of the members in antiorange are also members of kreml_org
25 of the members in antiorange are also members of nashi_storonnik
24 of the members in antiorange are also members of nashi_center
0 of the members in antiorange are also members of ru_ngo
8 of the members in antiorange are also members of ruprotest
1 of the members in antiorange is also a member of open_russia
7 of the members in antiorange are also members of molpolitica
4 of the members in antiorange are also members of stop_putinru
0 of the members in antiorange are also members of youthyabloko

Results for stop_putinru (157 members):

55 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of ru_politics
33 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of politics_ru
15 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of kreml_org
4 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of antiorange
8 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of nashi_storonnik
6 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of nashi_center
1 of the members in stop_putinru is also a member of ru_ngo
27 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of ruprotest
8 of the members in stop_putinru are also members of open_russia
1 of the members in stop_putinru is also a member of youthyabloko

Results for molpolitica (65 members):

38 of the members in molpolitica are also members of ru_politics
18 of the members in molpolitica are also members of politics_ru
16 of the members in molpolitica are also members of kreml_org
7 of the members in molpolitica are also members of antiorange
9 of the members in molpolitica are also members of nashi_storonnik
10 of the members in molpolitica are also members of nashi_center
0 of the members in molpolitica are also members of ru_ngo
11 of the members in molpolitica are also members of ruprotest
0 of the members in molpolitica are also members of open_russia
4 of the members in molpolitica are also members of stop_putinru
0 of the members in molpolitica are also members of youthyabloko

Results for open_russia (55 members):

18 of the members in open_russia are also members of ru_politics

15 of the members in open_russia are also members of politics_ru
9 of the members in open_russia are also members of kreml_org
1 of the members in open_russia is also a member of antiorange
4 of the members in open_russia are also members of nashi_storonnik
5 of the members in open_russia are also members of nashi_center
2 of the members in open_russia are also members of ru_ngo
7 of the members in open_russia are also members of ruprotest
8 of the members in open_russia are also members of stop_putinru
2 of the members in open_russia are also members of youthyabloko

Results for youthyabloko (45 members):

22 of the members in youthyabloko are also members of ru_politics
1 of the members in youthyabloko is also a member of politics_ru
1 of the members in youthyabloko is also a member of kreml_org
0 of the members in youthyabloko are also members of antiorange
0 of the members in youthyabloko are also members of nashi_storonnik
0 of the members in youthyabloko are also members of nashi_center
1 of the members in youthyabloko is also a member of ru_ngo
2 of the members in youthyabloko are also members of ruprotest
2 of the members in youthyabloko are also members of open_russia
1 of the members in youthyabloko is also a member of stop_putinru

Results for ru_ngo (22 members):

3 of the members in ru_ngo are also members of ru_politics
3 of the members in ru_ngo are also members of politics_ru
2 of the members in ru_ngo are also members of kreml_org
0 of the members in ru_ngo are also members of antiorange
1 of the members in ru_ngo is also a member of nashi_storonnik
2 of the members in ru_ngo are also members of nashi_center
1 of the members in ru_ngo is also a member of ruprotest
2 of the members in ru_ngo are also members of open_russia
1 of the members in ru_ngo is also a member of stop_putinru
1 of the members in ru_ngo is also a member of youthyabloko

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